Global Development: Views from the Center

Let's be accurate. CARE has no intention of halting in-kind food aid, only monetization. CARE will continue to monetize in "certain circumstances." Most large scale damaging sales of US food aid are from Title I, not Title II. A LOT more nuance is needed in these articles.

Three cheers for Nugent and Radelet at CGD, for Celia Dugger at NYTimes, and especially for Helene Gayle and staff at CARE! At last, a major U.S. assistance organization has got it right and declined to continue undermining local farming and food markets.

U.S. food aid often lessens starvation in short-term emergencies and it sometimes improves nutrition (e.g., of children) in multi-year programs but, however well-intented by some, as the program is presently construed via non-governmental organizations and their sales for local currency generation, its net long-term effects on local food production and marketing are pernicious in many countries.

Thanks to Radelet for noting that USAID has tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to lessen the negative impacts of Title-II. The program has for decades served domestic U.S. agricultural interests first and foremost.

As health/population and as program officer at USAID over 25 years, I often worked closely with U.S. Title-II / PL-480 overseas food assistance programs in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. I wish we could be optimistic about improving U.S. food aid but that is highly unlikely, CARE's new position notwithstanding. Rational and moral appeals didn't work 20 years ago and there is little reason to think that 'moral leadership' is more promising today, alas.

Several years ago I researched the process of policy formation as NGOs worked to influence foreign economic policies. These foreign aid policies sought to benefit developing nations in ways similar in type if not magnitude to the Farm Bill. I found that the problems with policies intended to benefit developing countries were rooted in the fundamental inequality of the policy making process.

Several NGOs drafted and introduced promising new policies that they worked to shepherd through Congress. However, even these policies were largely based on U.S. NGO's *perceptions* of less-developed countries interests. They did not reflect the close involvement of representatives of the country/countries in question, who have critical experience and knowledge that should be the base of appropriate policy with heavy impacts on their nation.

Although some may argue that such involvement is not an appropriate role for foreign advocates, foreign businesses may and do lobby Congress regularly. Particularly as the world continues to globalize, there is no reason why representatives of foreign NGOs/civil societies, whose lives are meaningfully shaped by U.S. policies might not do the same.

In order to pass legislation, additional changes or additions are made to legislation, or bills are combined, in ways that frequently end up directly benefiting U.S. interests as part of the "compromise" necessary to pass legislation.

NGOs involve representatives from less wealthy countries to varying extents. In the end, however, NGOs may override the views of representatives of these countries in final decision making and compromises in an effort to get *something* passed. Unfortunately, the something being passed usually tosses out a few bones, while compromises reinforce the status quo. The extent to which this occurred varied by NGO, but was an influential force in all cases.

Without explicit rules and processes to ensure that policies reflect the interests of less-developed countries, it is easy for NGOs with relatively larger power and influence to discount alternative views; it is not possible for the fox to create appropriate policies for the hen. Although the NGOs had good intentions, they also view the world through U.S. culture and interests, and thus have an inherent conflict of interest.

Even if NGOs were to recognize this, and cede more decision making to less-developed country representatives, the NGOs are not strong enough to pass legislation on their own. However, the effects of globalization have become more obvious and broadly known, and the corporate world and some governments of "developed" countries are taking more of an interest in having a real impact.

NGOs, corporations and developed-country governments could, ideally, support and assist representatives of less-developed countries as they represent their own interests.

Only when those representatives are empowered to *take the lead* in advocating will policies have the potential to change the status quo. Otherwise stated, only when policy-making processes are made more egalitarian, will the resulting policies have real potential to make the world more egalitarian.

Lara Fischer

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Lara Fischer, PhD
Silver Spring, MD
larafischer@netzero.net

I applaud CARE as well. If this inspires much needed reforms in foreign aid, this could go a long way for solving Africa's agricultural deficit. It just doesn't pay in many countries to grow food for domestic sale. The challenge will be ensuring those increased domestic supplies do not become dependent on external purchasers.

Carl LeVan
American University, SIS

I completely agree that CARE should be commended for this brave decision. It's never easy for an NGO (or anyone else for that matter) to turn away money on principle.

The problems in the US food aid program are myriad - which is not to acknowledge that our program fundamentally does offer life-saving assistance to millions of desperate people. But the inefficiency of the system and the contradictory policy mandates can be major problems - raising the kind of ethical questions CARE struggled with.

I have one quibble with Steve's comment. He seems to imply that food aid displacing imports is not a problem. It may not be a problem in depressing or displacing local agricultural production, but it's a problem for importers. Most trade and development experts have been advocating for greater regional integration and trade among developing countries - particularly in sub-Saharan Africa for decades. That means food deficit countries should import from food surplus countries. Often, surpluses and deficits can shift year by year.

So, displacing imports can mean denying markets to other poor country farmers and, I would argue, would tend to slow the integration of these markets which has been a long-term goal.

Why, exactly, are we supposed to cheer CARE? I don't get it. Where is the evidence to suggest that this policy shift will result in fewer hungry people (or, in Title II language, less food insecurity)? I concede that it may make for a more efficient system, and perhaps even a more "ethical" system (depending upon your perspective), but where is the evidence that ending monetization will advance the interests of people who are food insecure?

As Mr. Radelet explains, in many cases monetized food aid has no disincentive effect on local production. And even the critics of monetization allow that the development interventions supported through monetization usually benefit poor and food-insecure people (Barrett and Maxwell 2005: 189-191, 212-213), a point also made by Ms. Dugger's article. While it certainly would not have made for juicy headlines, why didn't CARE simply resolve to only use monetization in cases in which its effect on local production and food security is positive? I know that if I were food insecure and living in a country receiving Title II assistance, this is what I would want of my advocate, rather than a policy likely to result in fewer resources designated for fighting food insecurity.

Joel J. Toppen
Associate Professor of Political Science
Hope College