E-mail updates

Sign up to receive updates from CGD:

  
Buy CGD books

Global Development: Views from the Center

« Put Double Majority Voting Back on the Table at the IMF | Main | The Other Surge: A Frontline View of Development in Iraq »

April 07, 2008

NYT Microcredit Story Raises a Tough Question: Does 100 Percent Interest Help Poor People?

Posted by David Roodman at 11:36 AM

The New York Times ran a story on Saturday by Elisabeth Malkin, called "Problems for Microfinancing in Mexico," that illustrates the difficulties of sizing up microcredit. The article surveys the controversy over the initial public offering of shares in Compartamos, a Mexican microfinance bank, which "began as a nongovernmental organization in 1990, started by a Catholic social action group called Gente Nueva, whose inspiration was a visit by Mother Teresa to Mexico." The spectacular IPO last April raised $450 million for the company, turned the founders into multimillionaires, and generated nine-figure gains for early investors including non-profit Accion International and the World Bank's private sector lending arm, the IFC. The IPO was a Richter-9 earthquake in the microfinance world, seeding contention between those whose vision for microfinance is of a rapidly growing commercial industry reaching millions more people each year and those dismayed at businessmen making fortunes on the backs of the poor thanks to annual interest rates approaching 100%. (For facts, see Rich Rosenberg's note for CGAP, also in Spanish and Arabic. For a round-up of opinions see the State of the Microcredit Summit Campaign Report 2007.)

The Times article closes with first-hand observations of a group of Compartamos borrowers in the village of Valle de Vazquez. We learn that Silvina Martinez, unfazed by the high interest rate, is investing her credit in her restaurant. "It's my own business…You are a slave to it, but at least it's mine." Alejandra Abundez and her daughter use the credit to feed their livestock and stock their tiny store.

Readers may finish this article and wonder, "Who is right? Is this usury or private enterprise at its best?" What should decide the matter is whether Compartamos's 100%-per-annum credit is actually helping poor Mexicans -- and that is surprisingly difficult to judge. How can we or the reporter know what the lives of Ms. Martinez and Ms. Abundez would have been like without this credit? Would they have said different things out of earshot of their Compartamos loan officer? Even if we knew, how can we judge whether their experiences are representative? As any project evaluator or reporter or thoughtful person who has studied the affairs of human beings will tell you, the truth is elusive. Instinctively, the human mind seeks stories to encode what it "knows" about the world -- and so in microfinance, as in so many realms, there is combat by storytelling. BusinessWeek exposes the "Ugly Side of Microlending" in a much harder-hitting piece on Mexico while Accion tells encouraging stories of its clients.

How to make sense of it all? One tack is to view the Compartamos debate as mainly over interest rates and profits. Roughly, Grameen Bank founder and Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus says the 20-30% charged in Bangladesh is good, but the 100% in Mexico is a sign of a microbanker that has strayed from the proper mission and culture of service to the poor. "There is no justification whatsoever to charge hundred percent," he told PBS. "Only justification is, we want to make money." But the economics of microcredit differ fundamentally between Latin America and South Asia. For one, skilled people to run the operations cost more in Latin America relative to the size of the loans the clients can handle, perhaps because of much greater economic inequality. As the article points out, Peru's Pro Mujer, on anyone's short list of efficient and socially motivated microfinance groups, charges almost as much as Compartamos. And deeper economic and political factors may raise the price of credit in Mexico. When Uzma Qureshi and I interviewed Compartamos co-founder Carlos Labarthe for our Microcredit as Business report two years ago, he pointed out that his own Citibank credit card charges 40%. Still, there must be some level of interest where credit becomes harmful, some level of profit that becomes obscene.

I've come to see that three distinct notions of development shape debates about how microfinance affects people. They are not mutually contradictory but lack of clarity about which is meant often confuses non-experts and sometimes experts too:

  • Development as freedom. Nobel laureate Amartya Sen says that development is inherently about increasing freedom. High income, education, health, democracy -- all give people more control over their own lives. As microfinance guru Stuart Rutherford has eloquently shown, microcredit and other financial services give the poor options in managing their money. For Sen, that is development. But doesn't credit also trap some people in debt, restricting freedom? (Above, Silvina Martínez described herself as a slave…) I asked Rutherford that a few weeks ago in Bangladesh. He said he has looked hard for examples of the debt trap there and found almost none. Microcredit, unlike a Visa card, demands that repayment starts immediately, which helps defuse the "buy-now-pay-tomorrow" attitude that gets some card holders in trouble. And perhaps most people perpetually living close to the financial edge use credit more judiciously. Still, BusinessWeek and the controversy in Andhra Pradesh remind us that abuse can happen.

  • Development as institution-building. The development of the United States over the last few centuries is a story not just of rising GDP/capita, but of the birth and growth of many institutions -- governments, corporations, non-profits -- which have transformed how people interact to produce things they value. These institutions are to various degrees accountable to other actors in society, which checks their excesses, encourages them to innovate and compete, and makes for dynamism. In this light, the mere existence of Grameen and BRAC in Bangladesh and BRI in Indonesia, employing thousands and serving millions, is development, full stop. They enrich the fabric of their societies.

  • Development as measurable impact. This is the bread-and-butter of evaluators. If microfinance is radically expanding people's freedom, if those rising institutions are so great, shouldn't the benefits show up in how much clients earn and spend and how many of their children are in school? Impact is notoriously difficult to measure. I am convinced that nearly all microcredit studies to date have serious problems. A new generation of randomized trials (here, here, and here) may change the picture in the next few years. For now, the evidence is sparse.

Of course, we hope microfinance is succeeding with flying colors on development-as-impact. But for those who would learn from it, the history of foreign aid teaches humility. And the limits to human understanding of social phenomena like the provision of microfinance are more severe than many realize. The impact of outsiders' aid is rarely so dramatic as to be easily measured. In the face of such limits, we will often need to fall back on the first two definitions in judging microfinance and comparing it to other things that donors and socially minded investors could do with their money.

Falling back on the first two perspectives forces two bottom-line questions, one of fact, one of morality. Compartamos clearly scores high on institution-building. But is it increasing clients' freedom, their financial maneuvering room? Robert Cull, David McKenzie, and Christopher Woodruff found that Mexican micro-entrepreneurs earn 20–33% per month on additional capital -- 790-3000% a year! -- so borrowers may well get ahead even when paying 100%. But that is the average. Tough questions anyone judging Compartamos must ask are: What percentage of clients borrow only to see businesses fall flat, landing them in catastrophic debt trouble? And how low should that number be to make 100%/year credit a good thing overall?

Trackback Pings

TrackBack URL for this entry:
/mt/mt-tb.cgi/1136

Comments

David points out a number of incredibly important issues for microfinance and development, almost all of which have gone uncovered within the microfinance community and deserve attention. The recasting of microfinance within the different views of development is illustrative and particularly helpful in understanding many of the arguments made around the success of microfinance, its purpose, and its benefits and harms.



Having said that, I think there is an important debate around the Compartamos IPO and commercialization in microfinance, in general, that goes beyond the relatively binary question of whether Compartamos' interest rates hurt borrowers. In the view of many commercialization advocates, it is fully appropriate for microfinance institutions such as Compartamos to charge whatever interest rate the microfinance market will bear. It is assumed that new microfinance institutions will sprout up and crowd into the sector inducing competition and lowering interest rates. MFIs will be forced to pursue efficiency gains and design products to better serve their clients. In the long run, the microfinance market equilibrates to best serve clients.



John Maynard Keynes accurately quipped, though, that "in the long run we all are dead." In that period between today's admitted short-run disequilibrium and the idyllic and equilibrated thick microfinance markets with low interest rates, what is appropriate for microfinance institutions to do? The Compartamos IPO was galling not as much for the profits made as for the aid-supported roots of the organization and the ability of Compartamos to have charged much lower interest rates and still made out like bandits. The behavior of Compartamos post-IPO is particularly indicative with a lowering of the interest rates by 30% with still positive profits.



In that disequilibrated interim between the short and long run, is there a social responsibility for MFIs previously showered with aid and preciously poised as oligopolists (if not monopolists) to take lower returns (and lower interest rates to clients)? I have to imagine that MFIs as elements of development are at least responsible for that. We can expose the poor to markets in their full fury hoping for equilibrium quickly or understand that sometimes markets must be distorted in the short run when full competition does not exist. Here is where the spectrum of freedom expansion exists and where it is not enough to ask, in binary, if Compartamos is doing net good or bad. It is important to ask that, if it is doing good and expanding freedom, did Compartamos do enough to expand this freedom and could it have done more.



A final point, as David and many of the randomistas (said with admiration) evaluate the benefits of microfinance, it seems important to consider what clients are actually allowed to bank in the end. The impact of "microfinance" is so caught up in the types of products provided, the interest rates charged, the ability of the microfinance institution to provide timely delivery of funds, and wraparound services (business development services, health, etc.) that our conclusions should be humble. To evaluate the impact of Compartamos on its clients and proffer an opinion on the impact of microfinance is to look at one vaccine distribution program in a small Laotian village and to conclude that health aid works or does not. As opposed to saying that the fad is real or that it is bogus, I hope that we can reach a conclusion that evaluates when microfinance works and under what conditions.

Posted by: Ben Elberger at April 7, 2008 11:52 PM

Predatory ratings

Any group of debtors that is charged a higher interest rate because it is considered a higher credit risk, for instance the subprime or microcredit clients, is composed by those spending their money servicing a debt that they will finally default on, and those who should have in fact deserved a lower interest rate. Are there any real winners among them?

In fact a “subprime” group of borrowers could be seen as something akin to a health group insurance made up only between those who have been genetically diagnosed as having more risk of cancer. Those to which the diagnosis applies correctly will die of cancer and those who are fortunate enough to have been misdiagnosed will bear the full cost.

And herein lays the hard truth of the credit rating system. Of course you will have more opportunities to get more credit and bigger mortgages…but that does not come free… if you are poor and considered a subprime borrower, you are going to pay dearly for those opportunities.

Before we used so extensively current credit rating systems, most lending were given on quite similar interest rate terms; where most of the differences in the perceptions of the risk of borrower were reflected in the amount of credit given.

With the sophistication of the credit rating systems, which went hand in hand with the gathering of extensive statistics on defaults, came a greater awareness that you could profitably lend more to risky debtors, if you could get them to sign up on higher average interest rates.

The growth of the availability of credit this led to is of course only good news… that is, again, unless you find yourself among those not being able to serve their debt at the high rate, or among those who are paying a high rate just in order to cover for those who are defaulting on their debts.

Of course our debtor with a poor credit rating could always get a better rate after getting himself out of the hole he is in…but, as we all know, the best remedy for that… is in fact to stop digging.

Who is out there informing the poorly rated about how very dearly they are paying for their loans? Who is out there analyzing the murdering impact that credit ratings have in chipping away at the minimum levels of solidarity that any society needs to keeps itself a society?

If there is a minimum of things that needs to be done in the world of microcredits it is to set up a transparent system of incentives that stimulates and rewards good group behavior and gives back any “extraordinary” margins earned.

Posted by: Per Kurowski at April 8, 2008 07:20 AM

Post a comment




Remember Me?

(you may use HTML tags for style)