This article represents a very real and troubling dynamic within the Defense community as well. The blurring distinction between defense and development has lead to revision of military thought processes and paradigms concerning campaign design and the inclusion of development programs to promote stability in a region. Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency was recently revised (tentatively) to address this very same issue. I would like to pose a few questions to the author. 1. In your opinion, should the defense community be involved in the role and nature of development in unstable regions (Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.). Arguments abound stating we have a moral obligation to do so. Also, the very reason d’etre of presence in some regions is to provide stability, stability that can and should be complimented by development. 2. If this domain should remain in the realm of strictly development agencies (USAID), what is their role in a conflict area? Will those who wish to inflict harm make a distinction between aid workers and soldiers (case examples of UN workers being attacked make me tend to think not)? Finally, would aid workers be willing to work in conflict zones? Its dangerous yes, is it necessary? I believe so?? I humbly offer these questions, and look forward to your reply.

Respectfully,

Nicholas C. Castle

I wonder how they will reconcile their fundamental operating differences with respect to the hiring of third country nationals.

USAID prohibits (or significantly limits) the number of third country nationals that their contractors can hire, while Department of Defense contractors do the exact opposite. They rely on third country nationals that live packed in retrofitted containers under harsh conditions and in the line of fire, to boost profit margins through the outsourcing of humans from developing countries.

Yet, local talent in the developing country that international development agencies are supposedly working to develop, can’t be hired or expatriated even to a neighboring country were they share the culture, language and possibly possess valuable expertise. And, they could earn a fraction of the US expat that doesn’t speak the language and is being transferred from another continent.

The excuse is usually that the recipient country “lacks the local capacity.” The reality is short-sighted protectionism and unchecked abuse of power. I wonder how much longer before these incongruence’s that enrich a few contractors behind taxpayers backs will be tolerated.

I have found that there are perhaps more similarities between military and civilian development officers than one would ordinairily think. Certainly in the field, and for those with a post-conflict orientation, the focus on action and getting amission accomplished is shared by both. There is also a continuum of capacity represented by the Casals acquisition, and the MPRI acquisition of IRG, that facilitate work in conflict environments. However, the source of funding and therefore the control over the shape and nature of an intervention is still important. DOD’s apparent willingness to allow DOS and better yet USAID to control development funding is therefore critical. Let’s see if it really happens…

The main problem with articles and so-called “analysis” of this type is that the people doing the analyzing haven’t experienced that which they are analyzing. Th are asking the WRONG questions. It is not about personal security vs. human security – we know that we need a complex mix of security in these arenas. However, it is the melding of security and development expertise into an organization that can effectively address these wicked, extremely complex issues that is necessary. No single group of experts can effectively address this complex mix of problems; rather it requires a community of experts, with the special expertise in each area, to work together and with the locals on designing and implementing solutions that will work in each unique environment. The environments are indeed unique in that the mix of social-cultural issues, political and economic enviroments, legal and legislative framework, as well as national history are different; not only by country, but in many cases by district! We do not yet have an organization that is designed to bring those areas of expertise together in an effective manner. Yes, the PRTs look GREAT on paper and the intention is good, but if you see how they operate – rather how they spend 60-75% of their time fighting with the brigades (that house, feed and move them) for the right and power to do their jobs; not to mention the infighting among DoS, USAID, USACE, and Civil Affairs members “serving” on the PRT. Exorbitant amounts of time & money is WASTED on this poorly organized model of aid delivery and their inability to get things done on the ground with the locals. The Sr. FSOs, by policy are “in charge” of the diplomatic & development operations in Iraq, however the DOD has seemingly boundless resources from CERP, to the their own operational budgets (so huge they cannot spend it all on themselves so they add it to the programmatic kitty for Iraqi “projects” – whether this is legal is doubtful, but no one seems to care about the legality of what the DOD does in other countries). In reality, who controls the MONEY & the MOVEMENTS controls the access and influence with the locals. If this control is embedded in an organization responsible for the, singularly represented, relationship with their local counterparts then US influence become more powerful and more effictive. Use for example the Marshall Plan with Europe; each European country wanted their own bilateral relationship with the United States, however the organization of the Marshall Plan required that the European countries act in unison with the singularly responsible U.S. foreign aid delivery organization of the Marshall Plan. This promoted the coordination, and ultimate cohension, of the European community and prevented the competiton, and assciated corruption, that pits local parties against each other. We are, afterall, trying to facilitate the coordination and cohesion of local governing institutions to increase their own effectiveness and win public support for and commitment to a new form of government.

Additionally, it is not about transitioning the role of the security personal in the field to a role of development for which they are not skilled. It is a question of creating the organization of all the requisitely skilled experts to work together in the conflict zone to effect our policy objectives of security and development, while keeping everyone alive in the process. It has been proven that issues of human security, poverty reduction and economic growth are necessarily on a continuum and the organizational model put into place by the United States to effect change in all of these priority areas necessitates qualified, experienced experts with specialties in each of these areas to work together to address them simultaneously. It does not mean making an expertly trained warfighter into a development expert!

The notion that DOD companies are buying up development firms is problematic mostly from the standpoint of who they are hiring as “development experts.” That the article suggests there is little difference between civilian and military development professionals suggests how out of touch the analyst really is with development work and who is being hired to do it. The DoD firms, and many of the US foreign aid implementing partners, have been hiring retired military personnel into their development ranks calling them development experts. However, a former police officer serving in the Army reserve who then retires and joins MPRI is NOT a Rule of Law expert in the development arena! He is not qualified as a Rule of Law Advisor (junior or senior) and certainly is not qualified to lead a cadre of skilled civilian development experts. He is a cop with military training so he knows the culture and “systems” of the military so he should be able to get along with those holding real power & influence in these failing states. These DOD contractors are hanging a new tag on them and say they can do the development job – but they CANNOT and they DO NOT. This is an institutionalization of the civil affairs component of the PRTs where CA brigades are working in/on these PRTs but they do not have the development expertise and they do not have the will/ability to take on the “regular” army & its’ leadership. Hence, this “bridge” is useless. Only until policy truly clarifies the role of military as warfighters providing the security infrastructure needed for civilian development experts to operate in these zones – and congress backs the policy with the appropriate REALLOCATION OF BUDGETARY RESOURCES – will this inter-agency model of aid delivery begin to work. The 3D rhetoric complicates this entire process by publicly calling on DOS for leadership in the diplomatic and development arena without giving them the clout (money and appropriately skilled experts) to actually perform. Meanwhile, Sr. FSOs are an unwilling bunch…the politics of their positions causes them to fear the leadership role they are supposed to be taking. No Sr. FSO wants anything “bad” to happen on their watch so all their reporting is “positive” and “moving forward” when in actuality the military won’t move them (so they cannot meet with the locals with whom they are supposedly ‘moving forward’), the general’s out clout them with the locals because of their seemingly endless supply of financial and other resources as well as their “commanding presence” (the military goes through much better leadership training than FSO’s however they also have the added advantage of of the blind “follow orders” culture of the military where an 06 isn’t faced with an independent, thinking professional to question his orders…), and the locals KNOW all of this so they play the two sides (DOD v DOS) against each other.

Then, of course, you have the waste, fraud & abuse of power by the military and the way they “influence” locals to do things they want them to do (paying corrupt foreign officials, ordering the use of billions of taxpayers dollars (in the form of CERP, and their O&M) on useless “projects” they KNOW will yield no development (or diplomatic) result…just because they can. (there are far too many examples of this stupidity for me to go in to here…). So, the locals end up resenting them for the mess they are making in their neighborhoods, the local leadership/police are not strong enough or trusted enough by their constituents to enforce laws or security so locals pick up guns and shoot at the army. Then you have U.S. military personnel paying locals on development projects receiving 50% KICKBACKS from the locals upon payment with CERP funding. Locals KNOW all of this too – they see our corruption, they hear our rhetoric and they KNOW what is actually happening in the field and they hate us for it. It’s hard to blame them.

please read The Mission – it is somewhat anecdotal, but it drives home the point that it is the political leadership who has put all this development work in the hands of the developmentally inexperienced military. Wanting quick solutions that cannot be provided through diplomatic means (and most certainly not with a diplomatic system that has been so severely cut back), the last several administrations (both republican & democrat) have turned to the military with abundant, even excessive, resources to take on this responsibility. It is what gives General Petreaus the notion that he can run his own diplomatic mission out of CentCom – sending his own “Ambassadors” to the countries within his Command to do address his strategic priorities biforcated from the official diplomatic strategy of the U.S.Administration via the State Department. He is, indeed, “consolidating” the global war on terror across the entire Muslim belt from Mali, across northern Africa, through the Middle East to Pakistan! The U.S. Army is already openly present in all of those countries, except Iran.

It ALWAYS boils down to political will! We need this new batch of elected officials to have the political will to TAKE BACK CIVILIAN CONTROL! We are in all of these countries, running “transition” commands like MNSTC-I in Iraq, telling them they have to have civilian leadership over their military forces when we are not living up to our own rhetoric! But it is this same political leadership that ceded control in the first place and continues to do so with exorbitant defense budgets!

post-Soviet transition, (GKI, EY, USAID, IBRD) 1989-1998
OMB, 2000
USAID, 2003-4
MCC, 2005-6
Iraq transition, (DOD Contractor, USAID, DOS) 2007-2009