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July 22, 2007
User Fees, Optimal Pricing & Upward Sloping Demand Curves in Health
Posted by Mead Over at 01:45 PM
One of the most controversial subjects in global health is the topic of user fees for health services and commodities. Ever since Nancy Birdsall, David de Ferranti and John Akin declined to rule out user fees as a useful source of health financing way back in 1987, the World Bank has been pilloried for "advocating user fees" in the health sector, which the Bank has never done. By setting out explicit criteria for setting user fees in the 2004 World Development Report, the Bank resisted continuing political pressure to ban them outright and further fueled the debate. Among the donors, DFID (see also this white paper) has most adamantly rejected user fees as either effective or legitimate for improving access to health care by the poor. On the other hand, the social marketing of health care commodities, from condoms to antibiotics, is increasingly popular among actors such as PSI and KfW and presumes that the optimal price of these commodities, while heavily subsidized, is not free.
The obvious argument against user fees is based on the fundamental economic proposition that demand curves slope downward* -- e.g. that the number of people willing to purchase a product or service declines as its price increases. It follows that lower prices should result in more health care utilization than higher prices, and that zero prices would be even better. However, a fascinating new study by Nava Ashraf, James Berry, and Jesse Shapiro of the market for home water purification solution in Zambia finds that in fact demand curves seem to flatten out as the price approaches zero, and may even slope upward -- or, in plain English, that the act of paying a small amount (up to 18 cents, in this case) actually increases use over distributing Clorin free of charge.
The authors posit two reasons why people might behave contrary to the simple law of demand. First, the price effectively targets the distribution of the health commodity to those least likely to waste it. Second, people who have paid more for a product may have a greater psychological commitment to using it. They find strong statistical support for the first of these effects and weak support for the second.
If these results could be generalized to other health commodities, like bednets to prevent malaria, or to health services such as curative health clinic visits, the suggestion would be that sufficiently small user fees do little to discourage utilization; they might even increase it by stimulating the supply of health care quantity and quality. Although 18 cents -- the highest price that can be charged for Clorin in Zambia without reducing utilization -- seems like a tiny sum to people in rich countries, this would be enough to substantially motivate a distributor of a health commodity such as bednets or condoms, and a similarly small sum might help fill a financing gap in health clinics.
Obviously, this has huge implications for policymakers in developing countries, where cutting subsidies could actually improve overall health outcomes while motivating both public and private providers at the periphery of health care systems. Let's hope that the debate on user fees for health care is enriched by more such randomized controlled studies and that they look in more detail at supply and financing effects as well as demand-side effects.
*As an aside, the existence of upward-sloping demand curves has actually been in the news a lot this week due to recent evidence proving the heretofore purely theoretical case of Giffen goods.
1/15/08 UPDATE:
On January 9th, we at CGD had the pleasure of hosting Jessica Cohen for a presentation of her Brookings Working Paper authored jointly with Pascaline Dupas and entitled Free Distribution vs. Cost-Sharing: Evidence from a Malaria-Prevention Field Experiment in Kenya. This paper uses a randomized-controlled trial to test the hypothesis that people who pay more for a commodity, in this case a mosquito bed net, are more likely to use it then people who pay less. In contrast to Ashraf et al's results for the water purification treatment, Cohen & Dupas found no such effect. What's going on?
Well, as is always the case with rigorous impact studies, generalizing is a problem. While Ashraf et al delivered their water purification product to the consumers, Cohen & Dupas sold or gave away the bed net product to expectant mothers after they had walked to a clinic. One can imagine that the same woman who would accept free chlorine (perhaps to please the salesman at the door), but then not use it, might refuse to carry home a free bed net unless she wanted to use it. The substantial bed net promotion campaign that had gone on for years in the region of Western Kenya where the study was conducted may have disseminated so much information about the utility of bed-nets that the women did not need to use the price as an indicator of quality. Or the prices charged for bed nets in this experiment might simply not have been large enough to trigger cognitive dissonance.
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Comments
For a change, I have to agree with an economist about informing the debate about fees for service and commodities! When I worked in rural Rajasthan, collecting data for my doctoral work on gynecological morbidity and analyzing the demand-side issues vs. supply side issues of services for this area of reproductive health, I couldn't have learnt more about the low value of, and therefore low demand for, "free" (in this case, government) services. "If it doesn't cost anything, it is not good" and people don't want that service. They would rather pay a small fee at a private provider's clinic (often the Dr. from the PHC who does private clinics all evening from his house) and get "better" private care.
Posted by: Nandini Oomman at July 22, 2007 02:10 PM
or what about my girlfriend, who insists on buying bottled water despite our perfectly good tap water. I even bought an expensive filter, so she couldn't make spurious claims about contaminants in the tap water. In the end, she just likes to buy bottled water, likes the packaging and sense of getting something special.
Posted by: Gawain Kripke at July 24, 2007 02:28 PM
In Tanzania user fees have been waived only for children under 5 years. In the majority of cases, parents cannot afford the fee.
Every time children have a malarial event, mostly under fives are brought to a health post. They are saved with ACTs, which costs 10 times more than the classic chloroquine (which have become useless due to resistance), but is provided at subsidized price by donors.
However, when kids go back home the probability they will get a new malarial event and die are the same (immense) as elder brothers, which in their great majority have developed chronic malaria and live with the parasite in their blood, do not receive treatment because parents can not afford the "modesty" of the fee.
As a result, elder bothers transmit the disease to younger siblings at home, via the mosquito, and you have another avenue that explains why every year 1.2 million of under fives in Africa die due to malaria.
Additionally, millions of dollars invested in ACTs may be in vain and resistance developing very fast.
An economic reasoning on fees and health consumers´ empowerment must consider the details and the consquences in other sectors.
In Tanzania, in this precise case, fees actually kill millions.
Posted by: Daniel Albrecht at July 27, 2007 06:21 AM
The issue of pitching user fees at low enough levels that encourage demand seems sensible. However, such low levels would need careful assessment of transaction costs involved in administering these fees in addition to an appraisal of the economic costs to the client of fetching help. The issue is not one of whether or not, or as a similitude, how low, we need to put user fees. Rather, the issue is one of financing instruments available to donors to pay for health in poor countries. Much more promising ways forward are methods to stimulate providers to supply more health services of better quality, or creative ways to compensate clients for the costs involved in obtaining medical services.
Posted by: Gyuri Fritsche at July 31, 2007 09:55 AM
In the interests of disclosure, I work for PSI. One of the key reasons that we use a pricing system in our work is not that we wish to recoup costs or charge fees per se, or that we believe that charging a price encourages use every time, but rather that we wish to take advantage of an extant distribution network rather than create an entirely new one. Incentivizing the trade by allowing them to take margins allows us to piggy back at very low cost. In addition, allowing a profit to be made encourages actors of all stripes to ensure that products remain in stock at the point of need.
All of this is not to say that free distribution has no role to play. Usually free, subsidized and full cost product strategies need to all be deployed at the same time to ensure maximal coverage; the recurring, and loud 'free vs. not-free' debate is misleading and not particularly helpful in this regard.
Posted by: Stewart Parkinson at August 14, 2007 11:59 AM
There are some major differences between pricing of socially marketed goods and user fees in the health sector: 1) I bet there are no 'hidden fees' (ie bribes) to purchase Clorin; 2) related to the first point, there is a lot less uncertainty about what the true cost will be for a product (and what the risk of subsequent detention for failing to pay the user fee (see Burundi or Kenya as examples) compared to a consultation with subsequent diagnostic and prescription costs; and 3) the cost of transport and opportunity costs to the consumer are much, much smaller with socially marketed goods, affecting the comparison of a 'nominal' fee for Clorin vs a fee for a health user fee.
Posted by: Joe Amon at August 15, 2007 09:38 AM
In addition to hidden costs in the public sector, there are hidden benefits where fees or prices are accompanied with marketing efforts. Just charging a fee without any effort to justify that fee with marketing techniques does little to create perceived value. When a fee is charged for branded health products or bottled water, the consumer obtains a higher perception of value and has a greater willingness to pay for and use the product or service.
Posted by: Jeff Barnes at August 20, 2007 05:31 PM
I haven't read the NBER paper but the same authors have also written up their research in Forbes magazine (April 16)
Having read this piece I think that the authors have overlooked a rather glaring factor which explains the different behavior between households. What we are seeing here is an income effect. Could it be perchance, that "Households that agreed to pay more for Chlorine" are richer households? If so, is it surprising that these households (which would also be better educated) are more likely to use Chlorine. Having higher disposable income they would also use it frequently because they would be confident of being able to buy more later. There is no story here. How would it be any different for selling toothpaste: some (richer) households are prepared to spend more money on toothpaste and these families brush their teeth more often. Don't you think that Colgate have worked this out already?
It is in the conclusion that the rather sinister implications of this research come out. Here it is agreed that the more you charge the fewer people will buy. But basic economics tells us that as you raise the price the people who stop buying first will be the poorest. Apparently this doesn't matter though as "health should have a price" to "help to get lifesaving products into the hands of those who use them most" - in other words richer people! As most of our organizations trying to improve the health status of poor people I am not convinced about the merits of this pricing strategy. For these goods with high public health value our primary objective should be to maximize consumption by those who need them most not to maximize efficiency by restricting use (through high prices) to the people who will use them most. Rather than take the line "this stuff will be wasted on the poor" we need to get smarter at finding ways of marketing free commodities to poor.
Thankfully this has now been recognized by WHO. They say that the debate about distributing bednets is now over - you give them away for free:
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2007/pr43/en/index.html
The World Bank also seems to be coming round to this viewpoint, with its new HNP strategy saying in paragraph 105 that: "Upon client-country demand the Bank stands ready to support countries that want to remove user fees in public facilities"
A few people still seem to be clutching at straws that user fees can work, but thankfully most of us are now waking up to the fact that taking money of poor people when they are sick is not a good idea.
Rob Yates
Posted by: Rob Yates at August 30, 2007 03:24 PM
In reference to the comment made above: The authors of the Zambia paper say (on page 40) that, "We find no evidence that buyers at higher offer prices are wealthier or more educated." Comparative wealth, even in the low income target area, was taken into consideration.
The WHO press release itself recommends that nets are "distributed either free or highly subsidized". Both can result in the "easy availability" goals WHO expresses.
Defenders of a "free distribution only" approach miss that many times the largest costs are beyond the price tag. Free distribution centers often lack the convenience that sold nets provide. Going to the local shop at a time the beneficiary chooses is much closer to travel than finding the district distribution center and the beneficiary doesn't have to wait for the essential product for a special "health day". Improving/maintaing health always has a price. Without a serious review of the costs and benefits for health seeking behavior, we oversimplify and make serious mistakes. Having a better understanding for life on the ground, it can be possible to see that in some cases that distributing for an official price competes with "unofficial costs" (bribes) and replaces a highly changeable, under the table rate, with a more reliable printed rate. It could be possible that no longer burdened with the unattractive need to ask for bribes to meet living costs, health workers would be free to instruct consumers on proper usage or provide that extra customer service that should improve usage as well as attract others to come as well.
A blended model, consisting both of social marketing and free distribution, continues to be the best way to ensure high coverage of those in need.
The Zambia study takes a large step to better understand the psychological impact of paying for an item. It takes a needed step to promote the use of a holistic view of what elements promote usage- taking into consideration the comparative psychological impacts of buying versus receiving for free.
Posted by: Leah Hoffman at November 9, 2007 01:45 AM

