Where’s the Great Pakistan Aid Effectiveness Debate?
May 13, 2010
Gracing the cover of Tuesday’s Politico newspaper was the lead story, “The Great Pakistan Aid Debate.” Politico gets the headline spot on. But it misses another more important debate that should be taking place.
The mounting evidence that the Pakistani Taliban is behind the Times Square bomb attempt is a powerful reminder of the national security imperative of getting U.S. aid and development strategy in Pakistan right. Yet the key question facing U.S. policymakers is not how fast to spend our aid in Pakistan, or who should spend it, as the Politico story suggests. Rather, the burning question is how best can the $7.5 billion in U.S. assistance to Pakistan be spent effectively – to improve the welfare of Pakistani citizens in a meaningful way, and to keep Americans safe at home?
It’s little wonder that Politico made no mention of a “Great Pakistan Aid Effectiveness Debate.” I am baffled by just how little discussion I have seen within the so-called “Af-Pak” community about how the vast U.S. aid resources in Pakistan can be spent well. In policy discussions in Washington, there is simply no parity in the “Af” and “Pak” sides of the “Af-Pak” moniker. Afghanistan captures the lion’s share of attention, and to the extent that the policy community does discuss Pakistan policy, security considerations dominate. Rigorous discussions of development policy and how best to implement U.S. aid in Pakistan are far too rare.
This conversation is precisely the “Great Pakistan Aid Effectiveness Debate” that I believe needs to take place – within the halls of the U.S. government, in the pages of Politico and the mainstream press, and in thank tanks and the academic community. CGD is attempting to fill this gap through our study group on a U.S. Development Strategy in Pakistan. It is my hope that the broader Af-Pak community will join this important conversation.
Here are some questions I think could kick-start this alternative debate:
How should the United States reconcile the competing goals of its aid program?
To be sure, it is not easy for any donor to get aid right in Pakistan. For decades, donors in Pakistan have struggled to spend aid dollars well, and the results from the perspective of poverty reduction and development outcomes have often been disappointing. The challenge facing the United States today is even greater, given just how many different (and at times competing) objectives – including short-term diplomatic imperatives, stability and security objectives, and long-term development aims – the administration is endeavoring to achieve, simultaneously, through its aid to Pakistan. The list of priorities and objectives is long, exhaustive, perhaps even a bit exhausting, and at times contradictory.
To break this question down even further:
- To what extend does the foreign policy imperative of a strengthened U.S.-Pakistan relationship limit the willingness of U.S. officials to press for important (but politically difficult) reforms needed for long-term development, such as the extension of political rights to the FATA region, energy pricing reforms, or greatly needed tax reforms? How can priorities be balanced in such a way that the urgency of better U.S.-Pakistan diplomatic relations tomorrow does not crowd out the prospects for a more developed Pakistan five, ten years from now?
- Does the prioritization of social sector aid to the FATA region create a trade-off between security and stability objectives on one hand, and long-term development outcomes and impact on the other – if, for instance, aid dollars can be spent more effectively in schools in Punjab than in North Waziristan? Which priorities matter most?
- Ambassador Holbrooke has called for channeling more aid money through the Pakistan public sector to help build institutional capacity and ownership. Congress, for its part, has stressed the need for proper oversight of U.S. funds. And everyone has called for quick results. Are these three objectives—quick results, accountability, and capacity building and ownership–contradictory, particularly in light of Pakistan’s weak institutions and governance?
Do we know what really works?
- What really wins hearts and minds? Is it visibility and scale, as the administration has suggested? Or something else entirely: perhaps accountability, as indicated by Chris Fair, or transparency, as CGD President Nancy Birdsall has suggested in her first open letter to Ambassador Holbrooke?
- Can aid win hearts and minds at all? The evidence from Afghanistan tells a dismal tale: aid there seems to be losing, rather than winning, hearts and minds. Does the U.S. aid program in Pakistan run the risk of actually being counterproductive, if expectations are raised (and not met), or if Pakistanis perceive aid as a payoff to their government or contributing to corruption? How can the United States mitigate these risks? (Note: see Nancy’s call for greater transparency and the delineation of clear development outcomes and objectives).
- Do we know what drives extremism and conflict in Pakistan? Is it poverty and underdevelopment? The development literature is mixed: some studies (here and here) suggest that poverty and lack of opportunities are at least “contributing factors” to militancy. Other surveys challenge these assumptions, and document that at least some samples of Pakistani militants were more educated and had low levels of unemployment, and that support for militancy in one survey was highest in the more prosperous areas of urban communities. What further evidence do we need to inform the U.S. aid strategy?
Finally, who is in charge, and who should be in charge?
Is Ambassador Holbrooke in charge of the U.S. aid program and development strategy in Pakistan? What is the role of USAID administrator Raj Shah, and what should his role be in setting the priorities and strategy for the aid program – above and beyond his responsibility for implementing it? Are there enough development voices at the table?
I encourage you to join this debate and to share your ideas and suggestions in the comments below. To follow our Pakistan work and the CGD Study Group on U.S. Development Strategy in Pakistan as we endeavor to answer these questions, please subscribe to our newsletter.
7 Responses to “Where’s the Great Pakistan Aid Effectiveness Debate?”
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May 13th, 2010 at 7:12 pm
Molly Kinder is to be congratulated for catalyzing a serious debate about aid effectiveness with respect to Pakistan.
There are several interwoven problems in answering that question, but the first one centers on the objectives. To keep my response relatively short, permit me just to opine on this question.
One objective is to help stabilize a particularly turbulent border region where conflict and radicalization pose serious threats; another objective is to improve the quality of Pakistani civilian institutions and governance so that a stable, legitimate government has the trust of more of its people rather than the opposite; and a third objective is to ensure that more ordinary Pakistanis see the direct benefits of U.S. development assistance and perhaps better appreciate that the United States wants a close partnership with the Pakistani government AND to help ordinary Pakistani citizens achieve a better life for their children. State and USAID need to decide how much assistance is meant to be short-term shoring up an unstable area and how much is meant to be long-term development. USAID should be given the lead role in shaping how to deliver the assistance, but there is nothing wrong with ensuring that assistance is both top-down (building Pakistani government capacity) and bottom-up; moreover, the US Government overall needs to be pressed to determine how its assistance can complement other international efforts and how to avoid historical mistakes (e.g., problems from the Social Action Plan of the 1990s, where the absence of transparency and accountability doomed the intended benefits).
Because as Molly says Pakistan is so different from Afghanistan, the ‘Af-Pak’ label creates a crisis management approach to Pakistan rather than unleashing the long-range, conflict prevention potential of development assistance.
Furthermore, because the definition of what is ‘effective’ hinges on the goal we are seeking to achieve, I would contend that it is fair to enlarge the definition of ‘aid effectiveness’ beyond mere outputs to potential strategic effects; yet, at the same, because it is impossible to measure the latter, we still have to stick to empirically measuring additional electricity provided to citizens, children educated, and other realistic metrics. But such quantitative metrics ought to be coupled with ongoing qualitative assessments about the direction of the country as a whole.
My apologies for these brief points, which I know are but the beginning of a conversation and not easy bullet-point solutions.
May 15th, 2010 at 3:15 am
i oppose to aiding pakistan for developing society or arms forces specially for war against terrorism coalitaion partner (pakistan) i disagree cause the pakistan is one of country who is created taliban and gave shelters al qaida and logistic support in pakistan and afghanistan both side . i,m going to appeal dont give any more any kind of aid to pakistan . pakistan will use wrong way like crash balochistan national movement for freedom or genocide of baloch nation already the state of pakistan doing same act since last 63 years . pakistan can’t be change or convert extrimism or fundamintalism to liberal democrat or scularmism or real democracy there is so many organisation supporting pakistani army talibaan al qaida as u know well . please dont aiding pakistani goverment and army . i,m requesting the US goverment support baloch national movement of freedom from iran and pakistan who is dangurous for world …
May 24th, 2010 at 7:01 am
DEAR MOLLY KINDER, please accept mt gratitudes on well written article at this important point of turning when all the missions for peace and stability seems to be slightly confused.where the trust of element seems going weak.where the enemy of peace wants to spoil the situation futher worst.before i add my comments one can make out the mentality of a educated society like patrick cronin who has a point of view towards settlement and stability in society by playing positive role and on other side my jadgaal has a different story to cry asusual.america must continue the funding but they should supervise till the last.i ensure you that getting the positive feelings for americans is not difficult.i like to add the system of passing message to the user comminity is one of the weakest link.i strongly recommend to have one cadet collage only for fata students in peshawar or surroundings.this is very important and to bring out those young or future genetation and change their mind set.i will add strongly that no restoration work is in progress in all operational area ,where people can go back and restart their work.they should be given financial assistance for micro business projects,but through us officials not pak govt.military aid like bell heli must be covered in news.us govt must take serious steps to control afghanistan law and order situation.i think afghanistan govt need serious changes at top slot.pakistan politcians must convey the contribution downwards to public.us govt must ensure the supervision of their projects through own involvement and dedicated persons.the local people must be involved in local arae projects.in last all my best wishes who are working for this cause.people are understanding the support of us goverment and i am sure things will be good.jadgaal look the world from soft eyes than you will have better approach.i have served 3 years in balochistan…i can pray for them.thanks kashif
June 21st, 2010 at 5:15 pm
I wish the country i lived in valued freedom of speech and expression. I would have contributed much extensively. So Comments reserved!. Btw. Mr. Kashif i respect your point of you but i refuse to re-create “Alis in the wonderland story”. The things you just said will look good on a grant proposal you forward to an American in order to exploit him/her; As hes willing to pay you to secure the life, property and freedom of his people. I would appreciate if we remain practical while commenting, however what you potray is entirely ideal situation. Can you go to the project areas (sites) where GoP is spending the aid? I bet you can’t, even the natives cannot move their freely. How come you invite foreigner. Amazingly,Its not that easy or lets say impossible to visit scheme sites. That was something operational i pointed out. May be you get a chance or have the feasibility to visit a few convenient locations, where much of the amount is spent, as they are close to the settled areas. These sites serve as Model communities; which can serve as a sample (not representative ofcourse) to evaluate the effectiveness of aid in winning the “war of hearts and minds” (huh, i always wonder was it utmost necessity to associate war with hearts and minds, still). When you talk of millions of dollars then i doubt you will be able to keep a track of how many and who did you oblige. I know i am not making sense but as i said the absence of freedom of speech, restricts me. Ok! i will be a bit frank; These funds should not be used to bribe a few people or let say one out of hundred communities. I challenge all the surveys mentioned above; There can never be a positive relation between “A person resorting to violence” with “Unavailability of Clean drinking water or no health facilities or poverty etc”. Yes lack of democracy, lack of education, Lack of prospects from education, outdated Frontier Crimes Regulation Act, Sense of insecurity consequent to Atrocities of violent groups etc. These are Developmental gaps of 65 years, they can not be filled by a 5 years program and thst too in the absence of democracy and civil right+ These developmental gaps never caused some one to resort to international violence. However, now people have at least seen positive effects of resorting to violence (For instance you get water supply scheme if your cousin resorts to violence; i will want him to stay violent forever). I think i failed to reserve my comments.
June 22nd, 2010 at 2:39 am
e.mail correction
June 23rd, 2010 at 4:10 am
GOOD MORNIGNG MOLLY KINDER .
WELL THANKS FOR THE SUBJECT WNHICH IS U CHOOSE ABOUT PAKISTAN RETHINKING AID FOR GREAT PAKISTAN IT IS EFFECTIVENESS OR NOT ? AS YOU KNOW VERY WELL THE PAKISTAN IS NOT LOGICAL COUNTRY AS MADE BY UK SINCE LAST 63 YEARS AGO WE THINK THIS IS NOT LEGAL OR DEMAND BY PEOPLE REGION WE KNOW AS WELL WHO WAS CREATED PAKISTAN FOR WHAT . THE PAKISTAN FROM BEGIN A TERRORIST COUNTRY LIKE CAPTURED A FREE STATE OF BALOCHISTAN WHO IS ANNOUNCED AN INDEPENDENT COYUNTRY IN THIS REGION LAST 11 AUGUST 1947 . BUT PAKISTANI ARMY OCCUPIED BALOCHISTAN BY ARMS IF US OR UN OR WORLD COMMUNITY WILL HELP PAKISTAN ANY CAUSE IT IS NOT FAVOURABLE FOR WORLD . COZ FIRST OF ALL PAKISTANI ARMY ESTABLISHMENT WILL NOT BE CHANGE MIND SET WILL NO CHANGE TO REAL DEMOCRACY . WHAT THE MEAN OF GREAT PAKISTAN I DONT UNDERSTAND WHAT DOES IT MEAN ….
June 28th, 2010 at 7:12 am
Jadgaal!! Bro lets b optimistic. Watever PK is, We hv to live with it and accept reality. Try using ur energies for rectification not disappointments. Of-course there are shortcommings but lets fix them like global citizens without spreading hatred.